Minimal Synchrony for Byzantine Consensus by Bouzid, Zohir et al.
Minimal Synchrony for Byzantine Consensus
Zohir Bouzid, Achour Moste´faoui, Michel Raynal
To cite this version:
Zohir Bouzid, Achour Moste´faoui, Michel Raynal. Minimal Synchrony for Byzantine
Consensus. Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed
Computing (PODC 2015), Jul 2015, Donostia-San Sebastia´n, Spain. pp.461-470, 2015,
<10.1145/2767386.2767418>. <hal-01178651>
HAL Id: hal-01178651
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01178651
Submitted on 20 Jul 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NoDerivatives 4.0 International License
Minimal Synchrony for Asynchronous Byzantine Consensus
Zohir Bouzid† Achour Moste´faoui‡ Michel Raynal⋆,†
† IRISA, Universite´ de Rennes 35042 Rennes Cedex, France
‡ LINA, Universite´ de Nantes, 44322 Nantes Cedex, France
⋆ Institut Universitaire de France
Zohir.bouzid@gmail.com Achour.Mostefaoui@univ-nantes.fr raynal@irisa.fr
July 20, 2015
Abstract
Solving the consensus problem requires in one way or another that the underlying system satisfies some
synchrony assumption. Considering an asynchronous message-passing system of n processes where (a)
up to t < n/3 may commit Byzantine failures, and (b) each pair of processes is connected by two uni-
directional channels (with possibly different timing properties), this paper investigates the synchrony as-
sumption required to solve consensus, and presents a signature-free consensus algorithm whose synchrony
requirement is the existence of a process that is an eventual 〈t + 1〉bisource. Such a process p is a correct
process that eventually has (a) timely input channels from t correct processes and (b) timely output chan-
nels to t correct processes (these input and output channels can connect p to different subsets of processes).
As this synchrony condition was shown to be necessary and sufficient in the stronger asynchronous system
model (a) enriched with message authentication, and (b) where the channels are bidirectional and have the
same timing properties in both directions, it follows that it is also necessary and sufficient in the weaker
system model considered in the paper. In addition to the fact that it closes a long-lasting problem related to
Byzantine agreement, a noteworthy feature of the proposed algorithm lies in its design simplicity, which is
a first-class property.
Keywords: Adopt-commit, Asynchronous message-passing, Byzantine process, Consensus, Distributed al-
gorithm, Eventual timely channel, Feasibility condition, Lower bound, Optimal resilience, Reliable broad-
cast, Signature-free algorithm, Synchrony assumption.
1 Introduction
Byzantine consensus A process has a Byzantine behavior when it behaves arbitrarily [26]. This bad func-
tioning can be intentional (malicious behavior, e.g., due to intrusion) or simply the result of a transient fault
that altered the local state of a process, thereby modifying its execution in an unpredictable way.
We are interested here in the consensus problem in message-passing distributed systems prone to Byzantine
process failures whatever their origin. Consensus is an agreement problem in which each process first proposes
a value and then decides on a value [26]. In a Byzantine failure context, the consensus problem is defined by
the following properties: every non-faulty process decides (termination), no two non-faulty processes decide
differently (agreement), and the decided value is not arbitrary, i.e., it is related in one way or another to values
proposed by non-faulty processes (validity).
Context of the paper A synchronous distributed system is characterized by the fact that both processes and
communication channels are synchronous (or timely) [3, 21, 28]. This means that there are known bounds on
process speed and message transfer delays. Let t denote the maximum number of processes that can be faulty
in a system made up of n processes. In a synchronous system, consensus can be solved (a) for any value of
t (i.e., t < n) in the crash failure model, (b) for t < n/2 in the general omission failure model, and (c) for
t < n/3 in the Byzantine failure model [20, 26]. Moreover, these bounds are tight.
Differently, when all channels are asynchronous (i.e., when there is no bound on message transfer delays),
it is impossible to solve consensus even if we consider the weakest failure model (namely, the process crash
failure model) and assume that at most one process may be faulty (i.e., t = 1) [15]. It trivially follows that
Byzantine consensus is impossible to solve in a failure-prone asynchronous distributed system.
As Byzantine consensus can be solved in a synchronous system and cannot in an asynchronous system,
a natural question that comes to mind is the following “When considering the synchrony-to-asynchrony axis,
which is the weakest synchrony assumption that allows Byzantine consensus to be solved in a message-passing
system?” This long-lasting question is the issue addressed in this paper. To that end, the paper considers a
synchrony assumption capturing both the structure and the number of eventually synchronous channels among
correct processes.
Related work Several approaches to solve Byzantine consensus have been proposed. We consider here only
deterministic approaches1. One consists in enriching the asynchronous system (hence the system is no longer
fully asynchronous) with a failure detector, namely, a device that provides processes with (possibly unreliable)
hints on failures [10]. Basically, in one way or another, a failure detector encapsulates synchrony assumptions.
Failure detectors suited to Byzantine behavior have been proposed and used to solved Byzantine consensus
(e.g., [13, 16, 19]).
Another approach proposed to solve Byzantine consensus consists in directly assuming that some channels
satisfy a synchrony property (“directly” means that the synchrony property is not hidden inside a higher level
abstraction such as a failure detector). This approach, which relies on the notion of an ✸〈x+1〉bisource (read
“✸” as “eventual”), was introduced in [1]. Intuitively, this notion states that there is a correct process that
has x input channels from correct processes and x output channels to correct processes that are eventually
timely [12, 14] (the “+1” comes from the fact that it is assumed that each process has a “virtual” input/output
channel from itself to itself, which is always timely).
Considering asynchronous systems with Byzantine processes without message authentication, it is shown
in [1] that Byzantine consensus can be solved if the system has an ✸〈n− t〉bisource (all other channels being
possibly fully asynchronous). Moreover, the process that is the✸〈n−t〉bisource can never be explicitly known
by the whole set of processes. Considering systems with message authentication, a Byzantine consensus algo-
rithm is presented in [25] that requires an ✸〈t+ 1〉bisource only. As for Byzantine consensus in synchronous
systems, all these algorithms assume t < n/3. Finally, it has been shown in [4] that the “✸〈t + 1〉bisource”
synchrony assumption is a necessary and sufficient condition to solve Byzantine consensus in asynchronous
bi-directionnal message-passing systems, enriched with message authentication.
Content of the paper This paper presents a signature-free Byzantine consensus algorithm for asynchronous
message-passing systems, which requires only the two assumptions: t < n/3 and the existence of an ✸〈t +
1〉bisource. As these assumptions are necessary and sufficient to solve Byzantine consensus in the asyn-
chronous model enriched with message authentication [4], it follows that (a) the existence of an ✸〈t +
1Enriching the system with random numbers allows for the design of randomized Byzantine consensus algorithms. These algo-
rithms are characterized by a probabilistic termination property (e.g., [5, 9, 22, 27]).
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1〉bisource is necessary and sufficient to solve Byzantine consensus in an asynchronous signature-free sys-
tem, and (b) the proposed algorithm is optimal with respect to underlying synchrony assumptions.
The proposed algorithm, which is round-based, assumes that at most m ≤ ⌊n−(t+1)
t
⌋ different values can
be proposed by the correct processes (see also the paragraph “variant” in the conclusion). To attain its goal, it
relies on a modular construction involving two communication abstractions and two distributed objects. More
precisely, we have the following.
• The communication abstractions are the one-to-all reliable broadcast (RB) abstraction introduced in [7],
and a very simple new communication abstraction that we call cooperative broadcast (CB). As suggested
by its name, it is an all-to-all broadcast abstraction. This abstraction, which uses RB as an underlying
subroutine, is particularly simple. It actually captures important cooperation properties, which make
easier the design of upper layer distributed agreement algorithms.
• The two distributed objects are the following ones (the implementation of each of them use the underly-
ing CB broadcast abstraction).
– The first object is a message-passing version of the adopt-commit (AC) object (introduced in [17])
appropriately modified to cope with up to t < n/3 Byzantine processes. Each round of the con-
sensus algorithm uses a specific AC object. The aim of these objects is to prevent the consensus
safety property from being violated.
– The second object is a round-based object called eventual agreement (EA) object. Its aim is to en-
sure the consensus termination property. Hence, its implementation relies on the ✸〈t+1〉bisource
assumption.
It is important to emphasize that, when designing the algorithm presented in the paper, modularity and sim-
plicity were considered as first class design criteria. The algorithm presented is only the last step of a long
quest: “Simplicity does not precede complexity, but follows it” (Alan Perlis, First Turing Award).
Road map The paper is made up of 7 sections. Section 2 presents the basic underlying asynchronous
Byzantine computation model, the RB broadcast abstraction and the new CB broadcast abstraction. Section 3
presents an AC object suited to message-passing systems prone to Byzantine failures. Then, Section 4 presents
the ✸〈t + 1〉bisource behavioral assumption. Section 5 presents the round-based eventual agreement object.
Section 6 pieces together the previous abstractions to obtain the synchrony-optimal Byzantine consensus al-
gorithm. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. Due to page limitation, the missing proofs can be found
in [6].
2 Basic Model, Reliable Broadcast, and Cooperative Broadcast
2.1 Processes, communication network, and failure model
Asynchronous processes The system is made up of a finite set Π of n > 1 sequential processes, namely
Π = {p1, . . . , pn}. As local processing times are negligible with respect to message transfer delays, they are
considered as being equal to zero. Both notations i ∈ Y and pi ∈ Y are used to say that pi belongs to the set
Y .
Communication network The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an asynchronous
reliable point-to-point network. “Asynchronous” means that there is no bound on message transfer delays.
“Reliable” means that the network does not lose, duplicate, modify, or create messages. “Point-to-point”
means that any pair of processes is connected by two uni-directional channels (one in each direction). Hence,
when a process receives a message, it can identify its sender. Moreover, as there is no message loss, all message
transfer delays are finite.
A process pi sends a message to a process pj by invoking the primitive “send TAG(m) to pj”, where TAG
is the type of the message and m its content. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process can send
messages to itself. A process pi receives a message by executing the primitive “receive()”. Then say that the
message is received by pi.
Failure model Up to t processes can exhibit a Byzantine behavior. A Byzantine process is a process that
behaves arbitrarily: it can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary
state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Moreover, Byzantine processes can collude to “pollute” the
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computation (e.g., by sending messages with the same content, while they should send messages with distinct
content if they were non-faulty).
A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior is called faulty. Otherwise, it is correct or non-faulty. Given
an execution, C denotes the set of processes that are correct in this execution.
Let us notice that, as each pair of processes is connected by a channel, no Byzantine process can imper-
sonate another process. Moreover, it is assumed that the Byzantine processes do not control the network (they
can neither corrupt the messages sent by non-faulty processes, nor modify the message reception schedule).
Discarding messages from Byzantine processes If, according to its algorithm, a process pj is assumed to
send a single message TAG() to a process pi, then pi processes only the first message TAG(v) it receives from
pj . This means that, if pj is Byzantine and sends several messages TAG(v), TAG(v′) where v′ 6= v, etc., all of
them except the first one are discarded.
Unreliable (best effort) broadcast This simple broadcast is defined by a pair of operations denoted broadcast()
and receive(), where broadcast TAG(m) is used as a shortcut for
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} send TAG(m) to pj end for.
This means that a message broadcast by a correct process is received at least by all the correct processes.
Differently, while it is assumed to send the same message to all the processes, a faulty process can actually
send different messages to distinct processes and no message to others.
Notation The notation BZ ASn,t[∅] is used to denote the previous basic Byzantine asynchronous message-
passing computation model.
2.2 Reliable broadcast abstraction
This broadcast abstraction (in short, RB-broadcast) was proposed by G. Bracha [7]. It is a one-shot one-to-
all communication abstraction, which provides processes with two operations denoted RB broadcast() and
RB deliver(). When pi invokes the operation RB broadcast() (resp., RB deliver()), we say that it “RB-
broadcasts” a message (resp., ”RB-delivers” a message). An RB-broadcast instance where process px is the
sender is defined by the following properties.
• RB-Validity. If a non-faulty process RB-delivers a message m (from px), then, if px is correct, it RB-
broadcast m.
• RB-Unicity. A correct process RB-delivers at most one message from px.
• RB-Termination-1. If px is non-faulty and RB-broadcasts a message m, all the non-faulty processes
eventually RB-deliver m from px.
• RB-Termination-2. If a non-faulty process RB-delivers a message m from px (possibly faulty) then all
the non-faulty processes eventually RB-deliver the same message m from px.
The RB-Validity property relates the output to the input, while RB-Unicity states that there is no message
duplication. The termination properties state the cases where processes have to RB-deliver messages. The
second of them is what makes the broadcast reliable. It is shown in [8] that t < n/3 is an upper bound on
t when one has to implement such an abstraction. An algorithm implementing RB-broadcast is described
in [6, 7]).
Notation The basic computing model strengthened with the additional constraint t < n/3 is denoted
BZ ASn,t[t < n/3]. RB-broadcast can consequently be implemented in this model.
2.3 Cooperative broadcast abstraction
Definition This new communication abstraction (in short CB-broadcast) is a one-shot all-to-all broadcast
defined by an operation, denoted CB broadcast(), plus a read-only set at every process pi, denoted cb validi.
“All-to-all” means that it is assumed that all correct processes invoke CB broadcast(). When a process pi
invokes CB broadcast(v), we say that “it cb-broadcasts v”.
An invocation of CB broadcast() by a process pi has an input parameter, namely the value that pi wants
to broadcast, and returns a value, which is a value CB-broadcast by a correct process. The CB-broadcast
abstraction is formally defined by the following properties.
• CB-Operation Termination. The invocation of the operation CB broadcast() by a correct process termi-
nates.
• CB-Operation Validity. If the invocation of CB broadcast() returns v to a correct process pi, v ∈
cb validi.
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• CB-Set Termination. The set cb validi of a correct process pi is eventually non-empty.
• CB-Set Validity. The set cb validi of any correct process pi contains only values cb-broadcast by correct
processes.
• CB-Set Agreement. The set cb validi and cb validj of any two correct processes pi and pj are eventually
equal.
Feasibility condition in the presence of up to t Byzantine processes Let m be the number of different
values that can be cb-broadcast by correct processes. It follows from the previous specification that, even
when the (at most) t Byzantine processes propose a same value w, not proposed by a correct process, w can
neither be returned, nor belong to the set cb validi of a correct process pi. This can be ensured if and only if
there is a value cb-broadcast by at least (t+ 1) correct processes. This feasibility condition is captured by the
predicate n− t > mt. (A proof of this feasibility condition can be found in [18]).
operation CB broadcast(vi) is
(1) RB broadcast CB VAL(vi);
(2) wait (cb validi 6= ∅);
(3) return (any value in cb validi).
when CB VAL(v) is RB delivered from pj do
(4) if (v RB delivered from (t+ 1) diff. processes)
then add v to cb validi end if.
Figure 1: An algorithm implementing m-valued CB-broadcast in BZ ASn,t[t < n/3]
Hence, we assume in the following that at most m ≤ ⌊n−(t+1)
t
⌋ different values can be cb-broadcast by
the set of correct processes, and the corresponding abstraction is called m-valued CB-broadcast.
operation AC propose(vi) is
(1) esti ← CB broadcast AC PROP(vi);
(2) RB broadcast AC EST(esti);
(3) wait (AC EST(est) messages have been RB-delivered from (n− t)
different processes, and their est values belong to cb validi);
(4) MFAi ← most frequent value in the previous (n− t) AC EST() messages;
(5) if (each of the previous (n− t) AC EST() messages carries MFAi)
(6) then return (〈commit,MFAi〉)
(7) else return (〈adopt,MFAi〉)
(8) end if.
Figure 2: An algorithm implementing an m-valued adopt-commit object in BZ ASn,t[t < n/3]
An algorithm implementing CB-broadcast A simple algorithm implementing CB-broadcast is described
in Figure 1. When pi invokes CB broadcast(vi), it first invokes the underlying RB broadcast CB VAL(vi)
for all correct processes to be eventually aware of vi (line 1). Then, it waits until its set cb validi becomes
non-empty (line 2). When this occurs, pi takes any value from cb validi and returns it (line 3). Finally, pi
adds to cb validi all the values it RB-delivers from (t + 1) different processes (i.e., v was RB-broadcast by
at least one correct process). It is important to notice that, after the predicate cb validi 6= ∅ became satisfied,
new values can still be added to cb validi.
Theorem 1. The algorithm described in Figure 1 implements the m-valued CB-broadcast abstraction in
BZ ASn,t[t < n/3].
Proof Proof of the CB-Termination properties.
It follows from the feasibility condition, that there is a value v that is proposed by at least (t+ 1) correct pro-
cesses. Hence, these processes RB-broadcast CB VAL(v). It then follows from line 4 and the RB-termination
property that v will be added to the set cb validi of each correct process pi. Hence, the CB-Set Termina-
tion property is satisfied, and no correct process can be blocked forever at line 2, from which follows the
CB-Operation Termination property.
Proof of the CB-Validity properties.
To prove the CB-Set Validity property, let us consider a value v cb-broadcast only by Byzantine processes.
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It follows that a correct process pi can RB-deliver v from at most t different processes. Hence, pi cannot
add v to cb validi at line 4, which proves the property. The CB-Operation Validity property is then a trivial
consequence of the CB-Set Validity property.
Proof of the CB-Set Agreement property.
Let us consider a value v ∈ cb validi. This means that pi RB-delivered the message CB VAL(v) from (t+ 1)
different processes (line 4). It then follows from the RB-termination property of RB-broadcast that each correct
process pj RB-delivers these (t+ 1) messages CB VAL(v). Consequently, any correct process pj adds v to its
local set cb validj , which concludes the proof. ✷Theorem 1
3 Adopt-Commit in the Presence of Byzantine Processes
This object was introduced in [17] in the context of read/write communication. Here we slightly modify its
definition to cope with Byzantine processes (which by definition can decide anything).
Definition An adopt-commit (AC) is a one-shot object which encapsulates the safety part of agreement
problems. It provides processes with a single operation denoted AC propose(). This operation takes a value as
input parameter (we say that the invoking process proposes this value), and returns a pair 〈d, v〉 (we say that
the invoking process decides 〈d, v〉), where d is a control tag and v a value. An AC object is defined by the
following properties.
• AC-Termination. An invocation of AC propose() by a correct process terminates.
• AC-Validity. This property is made up of two parts.
– AC-Output domain. If a correct process decides 〈d, v〉, d ∈ {commit, adopt}, and v is a value
that was proposed by a correct process.
– AC-Obligation. If all the correct processes propose the same value v, only 〈commit, v〉, can be
decided.
• AC-Quasi-agreement. If a correct process decides 〈commit, v〉, no other correct process can decide
〈−, v′〉 where v′ 6= v.
Implementations of an AC object in the presence of process crash failures can be found in [17, 23, 29, 30].
The implementations of [17, 30] are for asynchronous systems where any number of processes may crash
and communication is by atomic read/write registers. The implementations of [23, 29] are for asynchronous
message-passing systems where a minority of processes may crash.
It follows from the AC-Output domain property, that a value proposed only by Byzantine processes cannot
be decided by a correct process. This means that an AC object has the same feasibility condition as CB-
broadcast (let us also notice that this is independent from the fact that an AC object can be built on top of CB-
broadcast). Hence, we assume that at most m ≤ ⌊n−(t+1)
t
⌋ values can be proposed by the correct processes,
and the corresponding object is called an m-valued adopt-commit object.
Implementation of an m-valued adopt-commit object A distributed algorithm implementing an AC object
in the presence of up to t < n/3 Byzantine processes is described in Figure 2, for a correct process pi. This
algorithm is based on an underlying CB-broadcast, which means that each process has a read-only local set
cb vali (initially empty).
When a process pi invokes AC propose(vi), it first issues the operation CB broadcast AC PROP(vi) from
which it obtains a value that it saves in esti (line 1). It then RB-broadcasts the message AC EST(esti) (line 2),
and waits until (a) it has RB-delivered messages AC EST() from (n− t) different processes, and (b) the values
carried by these messages belong to the set cb validi supplied by CB-broadcast (line 3). Let us remember that,
after the predicate cb validi 6= ∅ became satisfied, new values can still be added to cb validi.
When this predicate becomes satisfied, pi computes the most frequent value MFAi carried by the previous
(n− t) AC EST() messages (line 4). If there are several “most frequent” values, pi takes any of them. Finally,
if all the messages who made satisfied the predicate of line 3 carried the same value MFAi, pi returns the pair
〈commit,MFAi〉) (line 6); otherwise it returns the pair 〈adopt,MFAi〉) (line 7).
Theorem 2. Assuming that each correct process invokes the operation AC propose(), the algorithm of Figure 2
implements an m-valued adopt-commit object in BZ ASn,t[t < n/3].
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Proof Proof of the AC-termination property.
Due to the CB-Operation termination property, no correct process blocks forever at line 1. So, we have only
to show that no correct process can block forever at line 3. It follows from CB-Set Termination and CB-
Set Validity that the sets cb validi of the correct processes are eventually not empty and contain only values
proposed by correct processes. As (i) the value RB-broadcast by each correct process at line 2 is a value of its
set cb validi, (ii) there are at least (n− t) correct processes, and (iii) the sets cb validi of the correct processes
are eventually equal (CB-Set Agreement property), it follows that the predicate of line 3 is eventually satisfied
at each correct process, which concludes the proof of AC-termination property. Proof of the AC-Output domain
property.
Let us first observe that a correct process can decide only the pair 〈commit, v〉 or the pair 〈adopt, v〉 (lines 6-
7). Hence, we have only to show that v is a value proposed by a correct process. A value v decided by a
correct process pi was RB-delivered in a message AC EST(v). It follows from the predicate of line 3 that
v ∈ cb validi. Finally, if follows from the CB-Set Validity property that v is a value proposed by a correct
process. Proof of the AC-Obligation property.
If all correct processes propose the same value v, it follows from the CB-Set (Termination, Validity, and
Agreement) properties that the set cb validi of each correct process pi is eventually equal to {v}. Hence, each
correct process RB-broadcasts the message AC EST(v) at line 2. It then follows from the predicate of line 3
that no value different from v can be decided. Proof of the AC-Quasi-agreement property.
Let pi and pj be two correct processes such that pi decides the pair 〈commit, v〉 while pj decides 〈−, v′〉. As pi
decides 〈commit, v〉, it follows from line 3 that it RB-delivered the message AC EST(v) from (n− t) different
processes. As, due to the RB-Unicity and RB-Termination-2 properties, no two correct processes RB-deliver
different values from the same process, it follows that, among the (n − t) messages AC EST() RB-delivered
by pj , at most t of them may carry a value different from v, i.e., at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1 carry the value v. It
follows that v is the most frequent value RB-delivered by pj , and consequently v′ = v. ✷Theorem 2
4 The ✸〈t+ 1〉Bisource Assumption
Eventually timely channel Let us consider the channel connecting a process pi to a process pj . This channel
is eventually timely if there is a finite time τ and a bound δ, such that any message sent by pi to pj at time τ ′ is
received by pj by time max(τ, τ ′) + δ. Let us observe that neither τ , nor δ, is known by the processes.
As already indicated, there is an input/output channel from each process to itself.
✸〈k〉sink, ✸〈k〉source, and ✸〈k〉bisource A correct process pi is an ✸〈k〉sink if it has eventually timely
input channels from k correct processes (including itself). This set of processes is denoted X−i . Similarly, a
correct process is an ✸〈k〉source if it has k eventually timely output channels to correct processes (including
itself). This set of processes is denoted X+i .
An ✸〈k〉bisource is a correct process pi that is both ✸〈k〉sink and ✸〈k〉source. Let us remark that the
timely input channels and the timely output channels do not necessarily connect pi to the same subset of
processes.
Notation for system models The system model BZ ASn,t[t < n/3] enriched with an ✸〈t + 1〉bisource is
denoted BZ ASn,t[t < n/3,✸〈t+ 1〉bisource].
Discussion The previous notions were introduced in [1, 14]. Our definition of an✸〈t+1〉bisource is slightly
different from the original definition introduced in [1]. The difference is that it considers only eventually timely
channels connecting correct processes, while [1] considers eventually timely channels connecting a correct
process to correct or faulty processes. Hence, an ✸〈t + 1〉bisource is an ✸〈2t + 1〉bisource in the parlance
of [1]. We consider only eventually timely channels connecting pair of correct processes for the following
reason: an eventually timely channel connecting a correct process and a Byzantine process can always appear
to the correct process as being an asynchronous channel.
5 Eventual Agreement Object
5.1 Motivation and definition
This object, which is round-based, will be used to ensure the termination of the consensus algorithm, namely,
its aim is to allow the correct processes to eventually converge on a single value. To this end, it provides
the processes with a single operation denoted EA propose(r, v) where r is a round number and v is the value
proposed at this round by the invoking process. Each invocation of EA propose() by a correct process returns
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a value. It is assumed that each correct process invokes this operation once per round, and its successive
invocations are done according to consecutive round numbers. When a process invokes EA propose(r, v), we
say that it “ea-proposes v at round r”.
Definition An eventual agreement (EA) object is defined by the following properties.
• EA-Termination. For any r, if all correct processes invoke EA propose(r,−), each of these invocations
terminates.
• EA-Validity. For any r, if all correct processes invoke the operation EA propose(r, v) no correct process
returns a value different from v.
• EA-Eventual agreement. If the correct processes execute an infinite number of rounds, there is an infinite
number of rounds r at which all the correct processes return the same value v, where v is such that a
correct process invoked the operation EA propose(r, v).
It is important to notice that the EA-Validity property is particularly weak. More precisely, if, during a round
r, two correct processes invoke EA propose(r, v1) and EA propose(r, v2), with v1 6= v2, the invocation of
EA propose(r,−) by any correct process is allowed to return an arbitrary value (i.e., even a value proposed
neither by a correct nor by a Byzantine process).
As the implementation that follows uses at every round an instance of CB-broadcast, we assume that at
most m ≤ ⌊n−(t+1)
t
⌋ different values are ea-proposed by correct processes.
5.2 Implementation of an m-valued eventual agreement object
Definitions The algorithm presented below uses the following sets and functions.
• There are α =
(
n
n−t
)
possible combinations of (n − t) processes among the n processes p1, ..., pn. Let
us call them F1 . . . Fα.
• Given any round number r ≥ 1:
– coord(r) denotes the function
(
(r − 1) mod n
)
+ 1.
Given a round r, coord(r) defines its coordinator process. As we can see, if there is an infinite
number of rounds, each process is infinitely often round coordinator.
– F (r) denotes the function Findex(r), where index(r) =
(
(⌈ r
n
⌉ − 1) mod α
)
+ 1.
Hence, each set F (r) returns a set made up of (n−t) processes. During each round, its coordinator
strives to decide a value. To this end, it requires the help of the processes in F (r) to broadcast
the value it champions. F1 is used by the coordinators of the rounds 1 to n; F2 is used by the
coordinators of the rounds (n + 1) to 2n; ..., Fα is used by the coordinators of the rounds ((α −
1)n+ 1) to αn; F1 is used by the coordinators of the rounds ((αn+ 1) to (α+ 1)n; etc.
Considering an infinite sequence of rounds, it is important to notice that there is an infinite number of rounds
r and r′ such that (coord(r) = coord(r′))∧ F (r) = F (r′) and an infinite number of rounds r and r′ such that(
coord(r) = coord(r′)
)
∧
(
F (r) 6= F (r′)
)
.
Local variables Each process pi manages the following local variables.
• timeri[1..] is an array of timers, such that timeri[r] is the timer used by pi for round r.
• CB [1..] is an array of CB-broadcast instances shared by all processes. CB [r] is the instance associated
with round r. Hence, CB [r].cb validi is the set of values supplied to pi by CB [r].
To distinguish messages which have the same tag but are sent at different rounds, a message XXX() associated
with round r is denoted XXX[r]().
Algorithm: first part of EA propose() (Lines 1-5) The algorithm executed by a correct process pi is de-
scribed in Figure 3. Let us remind that, it is assumed that each correct process invokes EA propose() at every
round.
When a correct process pi invokes EA propose(ri, vali) (ri is a round number and vali the value it ea-
proposes at this round), it first invokes CB [ri].CB broadcast EA PROP1(vali), and saves the value returned in
auxi (line 1).Then, pi broadcasts the message EA PROP2[ri](auxi) (line 1) and waits until (a) it has received
messages EA PROP2[ri]() from (n−t) different processes, and (b) the values carried by these messages belong
to the set denoted CB [ri].cb validi, which is locally supplied by the CB-broadcast instance CB [ri] (line 3). If
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operation EA propose(ri, vali) is
(1) auxi ← CB [ri].CB broadcast EA PROP1(vali);
(2) broadcast EA PROP2[ri](auxi);
(3) wait (EA PROP2[ri]() messages have been received from (n− t)
different processes, and their aux values belong to CB [ri].cb validi);
(4) if (the (n− t) previous messages carry the same value v) then return(v) end if;
(5) set timeri[ri] to ri;
(6) wait (EA RELAY[ri](aux) messages received from (n− t) different processes);
(7) if (EA RELAY[ri](v) where v 6= ⊥ received from a process in F (ri)
)
(8) then return(v)
(9) else return(vali)
(10) end if.
when EA PROP2[r]() is received from a process in F (r) do
(11) if ((i = coord(r) ∧ (EA COORD[r]() not already broadcast))
(12) then let w be the value carried by the message EA PROP2[r]();
(13) broadcast EA COORD[r](w)
(14) end if.
when EA COORD[r](v) is received from pcoord(r) or (timeri[r] expires) do
(15) if (EA RELAY[r]() not already broadcast)
(16) disable timeri[r];
(17) if (timeri[r] expired) then v coordi ← ⊥ else v coordi ← v end if;
(18) broadcast EA RELAY[r](v coordi)
(19) end if.
Figure 3: An algorithm implementing an m-valued EA object in BZ ASn,t[t < n/3,✸〈t+ 1〉bisource]
all these messages carry the same value v, pi returns v as result of its invocation EA propose(ri, vali) (line 4)2.
Otherwise, pi sets the timer associated with the round ri to the value ri (line 5)3.
Algorithm: message processing and role of the round coordinator (Lines 11-19) Each round r uses a
round coordinator, defined by coord(r). As we have also seen, the set of (n − t) processes denoted F (r) is
associated with round r.
When pi is the coordinator of round r and receives for the first time a message EA PROP2[r]() from a
process in the set F (r), it champions the value w carried by this message to become the value returned by the
invocations of EA propose(r,−). To that end, it simply broadcasts the message EA COORD[r](w) (lines 11-
14).
When a process pi receives a message EA COORD[r](v) from the coordinator of round r, if not yet done,
it broadcasts the message EA RELAY[r](v) to inform the other processes that it has received the value v cham-
pioned by the coordinator of round r. If the local timer associated with this round (timeri[r]) has already
expired, pi broadcasts the message EA RELAY[r](⊥), to inform the other processes that it suspects the coor-
dinator of round r not to be an ✸〈t + 1〉bisource (this suspicion can be due to the asynchrony of the channel
connecting pcoord(r) to pi, or the fact that –while pcoord(r) is an ✸〈t+ 1〉bisource– the link from pcoord(r) to pi
is not yet synchronous, or the fact that pcoord(r) has a Byzantine behavior). In all cases, as timeri[r] will no
longer be useful, pi disables it. This behavior of pi is captured by the lines 15-19.
Algorithm: second part of EA propose() (Lines 6-10) After it has set timeri[ri] (line 5), pi waits until it has
received a message EA RELAY[ri]() from (n− t) different processes (line 6). When this occurs, the invocation
of the operation EA propose(ri, vali) by pi returns a value. This value is v 6= ⊥ if pi received a message
EA RELAY[ri](v) from a process in the set F (ri) (lines 7-8). Otherwise, no process of F (ri) witnesses the
value championed by the coordinator of round r. In this case, pi returns the value vali, i.e., the value it
ea-proposed (line 9).
2Let us remark that lines 1-3 of Figure 3 and lines 1-3 of Figure 2 differ only in the fact that an RB-broadcast is used at line 2 for
the AC object, and a simple broadcast is used at line 2 for the EA object. These lines have not been encapsulated to define a higher
level object because the messages EA PROP2[ri]() are explicitly used in lines 11-14 of Figure 3, while their counterparts in an AC
object –messages AC EST()– are not used by the upper layer.
3The important point here is that the value of the timer increases; as ri increases at every round, it is used as a timeout value.
More generally, it is possible to assign to timeri[ri] the value returned by an increasing function fi(ri), which can be specific to each
process pi.
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5.3 Proof
Let us remember that, by assumption, all correct processes invoke EA propose(r,−), where r = 1. Moreover,
they ea-propose at most m different values.
Lemma 1. Whatever the round r, if all correct processes invoke EA propose(r, v) no correct process returns
a value different from v. (Proof in [6].)
Lemma 2. Let r ≥ 1. If all correct processes invoke the operation EA propose(r,−), then each of these
invocation terminates. (Proof in [6].)
Lemma 3. If the correct processes execute an infinite number of rounds, there is an infinite number of rounds
r at which all the correct processes return the same value v, where v is such that a correct process invoked
EA propose(r, v).
Proof Let us define the following rounds:
• Let r1 be the first round that is strictly greater than 2δ.
• Let pℓ be an ✸〈t+ 1〉bisource. There exists a round r2 such that in every subsequent round:
- Each message sent by any px ∈ X−ℓ to pℓ is received within an interval of at most δ time units.
- Each message sent by pℓ to any py ∈ X+ℓ is received within an interval of at most δ time units.
• Let r > max(r1, r2) be any round coordinated by pℓ such that X+ℓ ⊆ F (r) and F (r) ⊆ C. Let us notice
that, due to the definition of F (r), an infinity of such rounds r exists.
Claim C. For every process pi ∈ X+ℓ , we have v coordi 6= ⊥ in round r (line 18).
Proof of claim C. Let pi be any process in X+ℓ . Let τ be the time at which pi sets the timer at line 5 of round r.
At this moment, since pi finished executing line 4, there are at least (n− t) processes from which pi received
an EA PROP2[r]() message. Since |X−ℓ | ≥ t+1, it follows that among these (n− t) processes, there is at least
one, say pk, that belongs to X−ℓ . Observe that pk necessarily broadcast the message EA PROP2[r]() before τ .
Since r > r2, this message is received by pℓ before time τ + δ.
Therefore, if pℓ did not broadcast a message EA COORD[r]() before receiving EA PROP2[r]() from pk, as
pk ∈ X
−
ℓ ⊆ F (r), the condition of line 11 and the when statement preceding it are both satisfied, and pℓ
broadcasts EA COORD[r]() at line 13. Consequently, in all cases, pℓ broadcasts a message EA COORD[r]() by
time τ + δ. Finally, since pi ∈ X+ℓ and r > r2, this message is received by pi before time τ + 2δ.
Let us recall that, as r > r1, it holds that r > 2δ, and consequently, since pi set timeri[r] to r (line 8)
at time τ , the timeout occurs after time τ + 2δ. Therefore, pi receives the message EA COORD[r]() from pℓ
before the timeout. Consequently, when evaluated by pi, the predicate of line 17 is necessarily false, and
v coordi 6= ⊥. This proves the claim.
We show in the following that all correct processes return the same value in round r. Let us first observe
that every correct process broadcasts an EA PROP2[r]() message that carries a value which was necessarily
ea-proposed by a correct process. Therefore, since pℓ is correct (and is the coordinator of r), the message
EA COORD[r]() it broadcasts in round r contains a value, say w, that was sent to it by a correct process.
Therefore, since (due to the definition of r), the processes of F (r) are correct, the EA RELAY[r]() messages
broadcast by them carry either w or ⊥. Consequently, every correct process pi can either returns w or vali
after executing the lines 7-10. To finish the proof, it remains to show that no correct process pi returns vali (if
vali 6= w).
Let us observe that each correct process waits at line 6 until it receives (n − t) EA RELAY[r]() messages.
Since |X+ℓ | > t, it follows that at least one of these messages was broadcast by a process in X
+
ℓ . Due to Claim
C, this message cannot carry ⊥. It then follows from the predicate of line 7 that any correct process executes
line 8 and returns w, which proves the lemma. ✷Lemma 3
Theorem 3. The algorithm of Figure 3 implements an m-valued eventual agreement object in BZ ASn,t[t <
n/3,✸〈t+ 1〉bisource]. (The proof follows from Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Lemma 3.)
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operation CONS propose(vi) is
(1) esti ← CB [0].CB broadcast VALID(vi); % safety: validity %
(2) repeat forever
(3) ri ← ri + 1;
(4) v ← EA OBJECT .EA propose(ri, esti); % liveness %
(5) if (v ∈ CB[0].cb validi) then esti ← v end if; % safety: validity %
(6) 〈tag, esti〉 ← AC OBJECT [ri].AC propose(esti); % safety: agreement %
(7) if (tag = commit) then RB broadcast DECIDE(esti) end if
(8) end repeat.
when DECIDE(v) is RB-delivered do
(9) if (DECIDE(v) RB-delivered from (t+ 1) diff. processes) then return(v) end if.
Figure 4: An algorithm for m-valued Byzantine consensus in BZ ASn,t[t < n/3,✸〈t+ 1〉bisource]
5.4 Looking for efficiency: Parameterized eventual agreement
Time complexity of the EA algorithm The aim of the previous algorithm was to attain a round r during
which all correct processes return the same value (ea-proposed by one of them). Hence its time complexity
can be measured by the value of this round number. As the underlying synchrony assumption is eventual, we
only know that this number r is finite.
Hence, to eliminate the noise created by the “eventual” attribute, and consequently be able to com-
pute a time complexity of the algorithm, let us replace the ✸〈t + 1〉bisource synchrony assumption by the
〈t + 1〉bisource assumption, i.e., we consider that there is a 〈t + 1〉bisource from the very beginning. The
corresponding system model is denoted BZ ASn,t[t < n/3, 〈t+ 1〉bisource].
The uncertainty created by the “eventual” attribute is consequently eliminated, and the only uncertainty
is the identity of the bisource and its associated input and output timely channels. As there are n processes
and α =
(
n
n−t
)
combinations for the sets F (r), it follows that the algorithm, which works in BZ ASn,t[t <
n/3,✸〈t+1〉bisource], terminates in at most αn rounds when the system behaves as BZ ASn,t[t < n/3, 〈t+
1〉bisource].
Improving the time complexity One way to improve the time complexity of the algorithm (as measured
previously) is to consider a “tuning” parameter k, 0 ≤ k ≤ t, and use it in both the synchrony assumption and
the size of the sets F (r), as follows.
• The assumption 〈t+ 1〉bisource is replaced by the stronger assumption 〈t+ 1 + k〉bisource.
• Instead of (n− t), the size of the sets F (r) is now n− t+ k.
An algorithm, parameterized with k, extending the basic algorithm of Figure 3 and based on the previous
definition is described in [6]. Designed for the system model BZ ASn,t[t < n/3,✸〈t + 1 + k〉bisource],
this algorithm has a time complexity of βn where β =
(
n
n−t+k
)
when executed in BZ ASn,t[t < n/3, 〈t +
1 + k〉bisource]. As simple instances of this parameterized algorithm, let us consider two particular values
of k. For k = 0, we obtain the basic algorithm. For k = t, the time complexity is n, which is the best that
can be obtained with a round coordinator-based algorithm (up to n rounds can be needed to benefit from the
〈t+ 1 + k〉bisource).
6 Byzantine Consensus Algorithm
m-Valued Byzantine consensus In the m-valued Byzantine consensus, the correct processes propose values
from a set of at most m values. The corresponding object is a one-shot object, that provides the processes with
a single operation denoted CONS propose(v), where v is the value proposed by the invoking process. This
operation returns a value to the invoking process. If pi obtains the value v, we say that it “decides” v. The
consensus object is defined by the following properties.
• CONS-Termination. The invocation of CONS propose() by a correct process terminates.
• CONS-Validity. If a correct process decides v, a correct process invoked CONS propose(v).
• CONS-Agreement. No two correct processes decide different values.
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An algorithm solving m-valued Byzantine consensus Assuming m ≤ ⌊n−(t+1)
t
⌋, the algorithm described
in Figure 4 implements an m-valued consensus object in BZ ASn,t[t < n/3, 〈t+1〉bisource]. This algorithm,
which –thanks to the previous abstractions– is simple, uses the following underlying objects.
• Each process pi manages a round number ri (initialized to 0), and a current estimate denoted esti.
• EA OBJECT is a shared m-valued EA object. Its aim is to allow processes to eventually converge to
the same estimate value. Hence, the associated line 4 is related to CONS-Termination.
• AC OBJECT [1..] is an unbounded array of m-valued adopt-commit objects, shared by all processes.
AC OBJECT [r] is the adopt-commit object used at round r. The aim of these objects (line 6) is to
allow correct processes to decide a value proposed by one of them, and prevent them from deciding
different values, i.e., to guarantee consensus safety.
• CB [0] is a CB-broadcast instance, used at the very beginning to obtain a value proposed by a correct
process and allow a process pi to use the associated set CB [0].cb validi to check the validity of the
values returned by the EA OBJECT object (i.e., check if this value is from a correct process).
When a correct process pi invokes CONS propose(vi), it first invokes CB [0].CB broadcastVALID(vi) to ob-
tain a value that was proposed by a correct process (line 1)4. As already indicated, this invocation also ensures
that the sets CB [0].cb validi of correct processes are eventually equal and contain values proposed only by
correct processes.
Then process pi enters an infinite loop (lines 2-8). After it has entered its current round (line 3), pro-
cess pi proposes its current estimate of the decision value esti to the to the EA object, namely, it invokes
EA OBJECT .EA propose(ri, esti) (line 4). If the value returned by this invocation is a value that it knows
as proposed by a correct process, it adopts it as new estimate, otherwise it keeps its previous estimate (line 5).
Process pi proposes then the current value of esti to the adopt-commit object associated with the current
round, from which it obtains a pair 〈tag, esti〉 (line 6). If the value of the tag is commit (line 7), pi RB-
broadcasts the message DECIDE(esti) to inform the other processes that the value of esti can be decided.
Then, whatever the value of the tag, pi proceeds to the next round with its (possibly new) estimate value esti.
Finally, as soon as a process, that not yet decided, has RB-delivered the same message DECIDE(v) from
(t + 1) different processes, it decides v and stops (line 9). Let us notice that at least one of these messages is
from a correct process.
Theorem 4. The algorithm of Figure 4 solves the m-valued Byzantine consensus problem in the system model
BZ ASn,t[t < n/3,✸〈t+ 1〉bisource].
Proof We say that a process pi starts round r when it assigns value r to its local variable ri (line 3).
Proof of the CONS-Termination property.
If a process decides at line 9, it previously RB-delivered the message DECIDE(v) from (t + 1) different pro-
cesses. Due to the RB-termination property of the corresponding (t+ 1) RB-broadcasts, each correct process
RB-delivers this message from the same set of (t+ 1) processes, and consequently decides. So, let us assume
by contradiction that no correct process decides at line 9.
Let us first observe that, due to the CB-Operation Termination property that no correct process pi blocks
forever at line 1. Moreover, it follows from the CB-Operation Validity property that that the set CB [0].cb validi
is not empty when this invocation terminates.
As no correct process decides, and all correct processes invoke EA propose(1,−), it follows from the EA-
Termination and AC-Termination properties that they all terminate the first round, and consequently start the
second. Moreover, if the estimate esti of a correct process pi is updated at line 5, its new value is a value
proposed by a correct process. It follows that the correct processes start the second round with estimate values
esti containing values proposed by correct processes. As no correct process decides, the same reasoning
applies to all rounds r > 1.
Let us observe that the local variables CB [0].cb validi of the correct processes eventually converge to the
same content (CB-Set Agreement and Termination of CB [0]). Hence, there is a round r0 such that, for every
correct process pi, the set CB [0].cb validi is never updated after it starts r0.
It then follows from the EA-Eventual Agreement property of EA OBJECT , that there is a round r > r0
during which all correct processes obtain the same value v at line 4, where v is a value proposed by a correct
process. Hence, since r > r0, they all succeed the test of line 5 and adopt v as their new estimate esti.
4Even if, up to now, a process behaved “correctly”, it may crash in the future and become then faulty. Hence, no process can a
priori consider the value it proposes as a value proposed by a correct process.
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Therefore, all correct processes invokeAC OBJECT [r].AC propose(v) at line 6. Due to the AC-Obligation
property of AC OBJECT [r], all correct processes obtain 〈commit, v〉 at line 6. Consequently, they all RB-
broadcast the same message 〈commit, v〉 at line 7. An n− t ≥ t+ 1, the decision predicate of line 9 becomes
eventually true at every correct process, which contradicts the initial assumption.
Proof of the CONS-Validity property.
Let us consider the first round. Let pi be a correct process. It follows from the CB-Operation Validity property
of CB [0] that esti is a value proposed by a correct process. Moreover, it follows from the CB-Set Validity
property, that CB [0].cb validi contains only values proposed by correct processes. It follows from these
observations that, be or not esti modified at line 5, when pi invokes AC OBJECT [1].AC propose(esti) at
line 6, esti contains a value proposed by a correct process. It then follows from the AC-Validity property of
AC OBJECT [1] that the value assigned to esti at line 6 is a value proposed by a correct process. The same
reasoning applies iteratively to all rounds, from which it follows that a value that is RB-broadcast by a correct
process at line 7 is a value proposed by a correct process.
If a correct process pi decides a value v at line 9, it follows from the decision predicate used at this line
that v was RB-broadcast at line 7 by at least one correct process pj . The previous paragraph has shown that
such a value v was proposed by a correct process.
Proof of the CONS-Agreement property.
Let us first observe that, if a correct process decides at line 9, it decides a value RB-broadcast by a correct
process at line 7. Hence, the proof consists in showing that no two correct processes RB-broadcast different
values at line 7.
Let r be the first round at which a correct process pi RB-broadcast a message DECIDE() at line 7. Let v
the value carried by this message. It follows that, at line 6, pi obtained the pair 〈commit, v〉 from the object
AC OBJECT [r]. Let us consider another correct process pj . There are two cases.
• pj RB-broadcast DECIDE(w) at line 9 of round r. This means that it obtained 〈commit, w〉 from
AC OBJECT [r]. It then follows from the AC-agreement property of AC OBJECT [r] that v = w.
Moreover, pj proceeds to the next round with estj = v.
• pj did not RB-broadcast the message DECIDE(w) at line 9 of round r. It then follows from the AC-
agreement property of AC OBJECT [r] that pj obtained the pair 〈adopt, v〉. Hence, at line 6, pj
assigned the value v to estj .
It follows that the estimate values of all the correct processes that progress to the next round are equal
to v. Let px be any correct process executing round (r + 1). It follows from the EA-Validity property of
EA OBJECT , that the invocation by px of EA OBJECT .EA propose(r + 1, estx) returns v, and from the
AC-Obligation property of AC OBJECT [r + 1] that this object returns 〈−, v〉 to px. This means that the
estimates of all the correct processes remain forever equal to v. Hence, no value different from v can be
RB-broadcast at line 7 by a correct process during a round r′ ≥ r. ✷Theorem 4
7 Conclusion
A variant To ensure that a value decided by a correct process is always a value that was proposed by
a correct process, the paper considered m-valued consensus, i.e., at most m ≤ ⌊n−(t+1)
t
⌋ different values
can be proposed by the correct processes (i.e., there is a value that is proposed by at least (t + 1) correct
processes). To ensure that no value proposed only by Byzantine processes is ever decided, some Byzantine
consensus algorithms (e.g., [11, 24]) do not have such an “m-valued” requirement. They instead allow the
correct processes to decide a default value ⊥ when they do not propose the same value. The algorithms
proposed in the paper can be modified to satisfy this different validity requirement.
The aim and the content of the paper This paper presented a consensus algorithm for asynchronous Byzan-
tine message-passing systems, that is optimal with respect to the underlying synchrony assumption. This
assumption is the existence of a process that is an eventual 〈t + 1〉bisource. Such a process p is a non-faulty
process that eventually has (a) timely input channels from t correct processes and (b) timely output channels to
t correct processes. Moreover these input and output channels can connect p to different subsets of processes.
In addition to a reliable broadcast abstraction, the design of the algorithm, which is very modular, is based
on simple abstractions: a new broadcast abstraction called cooperative broadcast, adopt-commit objects that
cope with Byzantine processes (as far as we know, the paper presented the first implementation of such objects
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in the presence of Byzantine processes), and a new round-based object called eventual agreement, whose
definition involves a pretty weak validity property.
This paper answered a long-lasting problem, namely, solving Byzantine consensus with the weakest un-
derlying synchrony assumptions. Finally, as claimed in the introduction, and in addition to its optimality with
respect to synchrony requirements, a very important first class property of the proposed algorithm lies in its
design simplicity. “Simplicity ⇒ easy” is rarely true for non-trivial problems [2].
Acknowledgments
This work has been partially supported by the French ANR project DISPLEXITY, which is devoted to com-
putability and complexity in distributed computing, and the Franco-German ANR project DISCMAT devoted
to connections between mathematics and distributed computing.
References
[1] Aguilera M.K., Delporte-Gallet C., Fauconnier H., and Toueg S., Consensus with Byzantine failures and little system synchrony.
Proc. 45th IEEE/IFIP Int’l Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN’06), IEEE Press, pp. 147-155, 2006.
[2] Aigner M. and Ziegler G., Proofs from THE BOOK (4th edition). Springer, 274 pages, 2010.
[3] Attiya H. and Welch J., Distributed computing: fundamentals, simulations and advanced topics, (2d Edition), Wiley-Interscience,
414 pages, 2004.
[4] Baldellon O., Moste´faoui A. and Raynal M., A necessary and sufficient synchrony condition for solving Byzantine consensus in
symmetric networks. Proc. 12th Int’l Conference on Distributed Computing and Networks (ICDCN’11), Springer LNCS 6522,
pp. 215-226, 2011.
[5] Ben-Or M., Another advantage of free choice: completely asynchronous agreement protocols. Proc. 2nd Annual ACM Sympo-
sium on Principles of Distributed Computing(PODC’83), ACM Press, pp. 27-30, 1983.
[6] Bouzid Z., Moste´afoui A., and Raynal M., Minimal synchrony for asynchronous Byzantine consensus. Tech Report 2025, 20
pages, IRISA, Univ. Rennes 1 (F), 2015.
[7] Bracha G., Asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocols. Information & Computation, 75(2):130-143, 1987.
[8] Bracha G. and Toueg S., Asynchronous consensus and broadcast protocols. J. of the ACM, 32(4):824-840, 1985.
[9] Cachin Ch., Kursawe K., and Shoup V., Random oracles in Constantinople: practical asynchronous Byzantine agreement using
cryptography. Proc. 19th Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC’00), ACM Press, pp. 123-
132, 2000.
[10] Chandra T. and Toueg S., Unreliable failure detectors for reliable distributed systems. Journal of the ACM, 43(2):225-267, 1996.
[11] Correia M., Ferreira Neves N., and Verissimo P., From consensus to atomic broadcast: time-free Byzantine-resistant protocols
without signatures. The Computer Journal, 49(1):82-96, 2006.
[12] Delporte-Gallet C., Devismes S., Fauconnier H. and Larrea M., Algorithms for extracting timeliness graphs. 17th Int’l Collo-
quium on Structural Inf. and Comm. Complexity (SIROCCO’10), Springer LNCS 6058, pp. 127-141, 2010.
[13] Doudou A., Garbinato B., Guerraoui R. and Schiper A., Muteness failure detectors: specification and implementation. 3rd
European Dependable Computing Conf. (EDCC’99), Springer LNCS 1667, pp. 71-87, 1999.
[14] Dwork C., Lynch N., and Stockmeyer L., Consensus in the presence of partial synchrony. Journal of the ACM, 35(2), 288-323,
1988.
[15] Fischer M.J., Lynch N.A., and Paterson M.S., Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process. Journal of the
ACM, 32(2):374-382, 1985.
[16] Friedman R., Moste´faoui A., and Raynal M., Simple and efficient oracle-based consensus protocols for asynchronous Byzantine
systems. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2(1):46-56, 2005.
[17] Gafni E., Round-by-round fault detectors: unifying synchrony and asynchrony. Proc. 17th ACM Symposium on Principles of
Distributed Computing (PODC), ACM Press, pp. 143-152, 1998.
[18] Herlihy M.P., Kozlov D., and Rajsbaum S., Distributed computing through combinatorial topology, Morgan Kaufmann/Elsevier,
336 pages, 2014.
13
[19] Kihlstrom K.P., Moser L.E. and Melliar-Smith P.M., Byzantine fault detectors for solving consensus. The Computer Journal,
46(1):16-35, 2003.
[20] Lamport L., Shostack R., and Pease M., The Byzantine generals problem. ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and
Systems, 4(3)-382-401, 1982.
[21] Lynch N.A., Distributed algorithms. Morgan Kaufmann Pub., San Francisco (CA), 872 pages, 1996 (ISBN 1-55860-384-4).
[22] Moste´faoui A., Moumen H., and Raynal M., Signature-free asynchronous Byzantine consensus with t < n/3 and O(n2)
messages. Proc. 33th ACM Symp. on Principles of Distr. Computing (PODC’14), ACM Press, pp. 2-9, 2014.
[23] Moste´faoui A. and Raynal M., Solving consensus using Chandra-Toueg’s unreliable failure detectors: a general quorum-based
approach. Proc. 13th Int’l Symposium on Dist. Comp. (DISC’99), Springer LNCS 1693, pp. 49-63, 1999.
[24] Moste´faoui A. and Raynal M., Signature-free broadcast based intrusion tolerance: never decide a Byzantine value. Proc. 14th
Int’l Conf. On Princ. Of Distr. Systems (OPODIS’10), Springer LNCS 6490, pp. 144-159, 2010.
[25] Moumen H., Moste´faoui A., and Tre´dan G., Byzantine consensus with few synchronous links. Proc. 11th Int’l Conference On
Principles Of Distributed Systems (OPODIS’07), Springer LNCS 4878, pp. 76-89, 2007.
[26] Pease M., R. Shostak R., and Lamport L., Reaching agreement in the presence of faults. Journal of the ACM, 27:228-234, 1980.
[27] Rabin M., Randomized Byzantine generals. Proc. 24th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS’83),
IEEE Computer Society Press, pp. 116-124, 1983.
[28] Raynal M., Fault-tolerant agreement in synchronous message-passing systems. Morgan & Claypool, 165 pages, 2010.
[29] Raynal M., Communication and agreement abstractions for fault-tolerant asynchronous distributed systems. Morgan & Clay-
pool Publishers, 251 pages, 2010.
[30] Raynal M., Concurrent programming: algorithms, principles, and foundations. Springer, 530 pages, 2013.
14
